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Abstract: Milton Friedman (1962) is known for the claim that political freedom presupposes 
economic freedom (cf. Lawson and Clark 2010). Friedman's famous example is that there cannot 
be freedom of speech where the government owns the printing presses. Less well-known is F. A. 
Hayek's and John Jewkes's illustrations of the same principle, both drawing from labor 
economics. Economic planning – the abandonment of a freely operating price system – cannot 
function without resorting to compulsory assignment of labor. Similarly, no state may 
simultaneously fix “fair” wages and demand a given pattern of productive output and 
employment. It is impossible to both achieve income equality and accomplish an economic plan. 
Among Hayek's enduring contributions, therefore, is a demonstration that liberty hangs on the 
maintenance of the price-system.
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The argument that economic freedom presupposes political freedom is most famously 
associated with Milton Friedman who said (1962:7), “the advocacy of 'democratic socialism' 
[rests on the belief that] . . . politics and economics are separate and largely unconnected . . . and 
that any kind of political arrangements can be combined with any kind of economic 
arrangements.” It is possible to protect individual liberties without democratic elections, but 
political freedom is impossible without economic freedom (Lawson and Clark 2010). For 
example, Friedman famously points out (1962:16-18), the freedom of speech is difficult to 
maintain when the government owns all the printing presses and meeting houses (cf. Rothbard 
1977:26, Mises 1981 [1922]:538).1 Even were the government to decide to subsidize subversive 
dissent – as e.g. Harrington advocates (1978a:443, 1978b:357; cf. Lavoie 1985a:139) – the 
government would have to decide whose dissent was legitimate and worthy of subsidy. The 
government could not subsidize all dissent for then countless individuals would choose to 
become professional dissenters, and the quantity of dissent supplied would approach infinity 
(Friedman 1962:18). But if the government can only afford to subsidize some dissent and not 
others, and if there no private source of credit or funding for dissenters, then the democratic 
socialist government has an absolute power to decide whose dissent will be given a platform. 
Even a benevolent and altruistic socialist government cannot abdicate this necessarily totalitarian 
power. The democratic socialist government must necessarily declare that some dissent is 
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illegitimate, creating the same problem of totalitarianism which democratic socialism was meant 
to avoid in the first place.2
Less well-known, however, is Hayek's use of labor economics to prove the same point. 
This essay explores Hayek's neglected use of labor economics to illustrate how political freedom 
relies on economic freedom. Furthermore, we shall see that a lesser-known economist, John 
Jewkes (1968 [1948]), also used labor economics in the same way as Hayek did.3 Both Hayek's 
and Jewkes used labor economics to demonstrate that democratic socialism is “impossible” in 
the sense that it can never successfully accomplish the goals of its advocates.4 Even if it were 
possible to implement an economically rational form of socialism, its political institutions could 
not be democratic; nor could it promise to safeguard individual rights and liberties against 
government abuse.5
This feature of Hayek's – and Jewkes's – argument has been neglected, especially in 
recent discussions concerning the ultimate validity, soundness, and usefulness of Hayek's 
contributions. Any appreciation or criticism of the value of Hayek's works must take into 
consideration Hayek's arguments about labor economics. This essay proceeds as follows: section 
I examines Hayek's earlier statements – especially in The Road to Serfdom – about the 
relationship between freedom of occupation and maintenance of the price-system, especially in 
the context of full-blown command planning. This section discusses Jewkes as well. Section II 
shows that the same analytic framework which Hayek used in The Road to Serfdom to analyze 
labor economics under full command socialism, was used by him in later works – especially The 
Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation, and Liberty – to analyze labor economics in the 
modern welfare state or mixed economy. Section III uses the findings of the previous two 
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sections to reconsider recent debates over the nature and validity of Hayek's claims and 
contributions. We shall conclude that Hayek made interesting and important observations 
concerning labor economics which reinforce the Friedman's claim that political liberty 
presupposes economic liberty (cf. Lawson and Clark 2010). While Jewkes has not been 
mentioned in the debates over Hayek's legacy, in general, whatever is said about Hayek will 
largely apply to Jewkes as well. Section IV concludes.
I. HAYEK AND JEWKES ON THE ALLOCATION OF LABOR UNDER SOCIALISM
1. Labor Economics according to Hayek and Jewkes
All planning is necessarily coercive; it is impossible to plan the economy without 
planning individual people's lives. Planning means making people's life decisions for them. As 
Hayek notes, many of the planners have failed to realize this fact. “The consolation our planners 
offer us is that this authoritarian direction will apply 'only' to economic matters” (2007 
[1944]:124). But this reply is based on “the erroneous belief that there are purely economic ends 
separate from the other ends of life” (Hayek 2007 [1944]:125; cf. Boettke 1995:11). Economics 
is simply the science of choosing those means which are most satisfactory for accomplishing 
given ends. In this sense, every aspect of life is economic (Mises 1981 [1922]:107). Humans 
cannot accomplish any ends without the use of material means. For example, it is impossible to 
learn and obtain knowledge without access to physical books or classrooms. For government to 
plan the production of books and classrooms is to plan the terms and conditions on which people 
will be able to obtain knowledge. Therefore, Hayek (2007 [1944]:126) states, economic planning 
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raises the question of “whether it shall be we who decide what is more, and what is less, 
important for us, or whether this is to be decided by the planners.” “The authority directing all 
economic activity . . . would control the allocation of the limited means for all our ends” (2007 
[1944]:126). “Economic control is not merely control of a sector of human life which can be 
separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our ends” (2007 [1944]:127).6
Marx said that “in place of the government over persons comes the administration of 
things,” to which Mises (1981 [1922]:73) replied, “there can be no administration of goods 
which is not administration of men – i.e. the bending of one human will to another – and no 
direction of productive processes which is not the government over persons – i.e. domination of 
one human will by another.” Furthermore, Mises said (1981 [1922]:493),
Whatever people do in the market economy, is the execution of their own plans. 
In this sense every human action means planning. What those calling themselves 
planners advocate is not the substitution of planned action for letting things go. It 
is the substitution of the planner's own plan for the plans of his fellow men.
Friedman (1962) agreed that political freedom presupposes economic freedom, showing 
that there cannot be freedom of speech where the government owns the printing presses. But 
Hayek and Jewkes instead used labor economics to illustrate the same principle. Planning, they 
said, demands the coercive regimentation of labor, precluding freedom of occupation and even 
the choice where to live. As Hayek (2007 [1944]:129) states, “If they want to plan, they must 
control the entry into the different trades and occupations.” This is due to the problem of 
economically allocating labor efficiently absent the price-system. In a market economy, labor is 
allocated through differential wages. Every form of labor has some market-clearing wage, and 
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wages rise or fall to equilibrate supply and demand for labor. But under socialism, where wages 
are either equal or approximately equal, the only way to allocate labor is by political command, 
dictating by fiat who is to be employed where. But a system of compulsory, involuntary 
employment is hardly compatible with the aspirations of democratic socialism.7 
Therefore, John Jewkes observed in The New Ordeal by Planning (1968 [1948]) that 
“whatever the original intentions of the planners, compulsion of labour soon becomes inevitable. 
For how, otherwise can labour be got into the appropriate jobs?” (1968 [1948]:90). And further 
(1968 [1948]:191),
Labour is one of the resources which must be forced to fit into the [central 
economic planning] scheme as a whole. . . . [D]irection of labour is inevitably 
bound up with a plan courageously followed to its logical conclusion. . . . So long 
as the aim is a planned economy there can be no doubt of the trend of social 
pressures: it will be towards a progressive restriction in the choice of occupation.
Nor was Jewkes engaging in mere idle and unrealistic theorizing. In 1947, the British 
Labour government renewed its wartime requisitioning powers by enacting the Control of 
Engagements Order which empowered the government to conscript labor for essential industries 
(Farrant 2015, Caldwell 2007:47n19). Jewkes (1968 [1948]:191, 193) lamented that
the British planners, against all their best instincts, were driven to the restoration 
of conscription of labour in 1947. . . . By the autumn of that year it was the law of 
land that (with the exception of a small proportion of the working population) no 
man between the ages of 18 and 50 years and no woman between the ages of 18 
and 40 years could change his or her occupation at will. 
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Referring to that same law, Hayek (2007 [1944]:47) noted that merely “six months later [after the 
war] the same government found itself in peacetime forced to put the conscription of labor back 
on the statute book.”8 
Jewkes argued that this involuntary servitude was not a consequence of any despotic 
intent or moral depravity or abuse of power, but was dictated “by the logic of events” (1968 
[1948]:193) and by “the inexorable demands of the plan” (ibid.). Likewise, according to Hayek 
(2007 [1944]:47), “[t]here is no better illustration [than this regimentation of labor] of the 
manner in which the inherent logic of their policies drove an unwilling socialist government into 
the kind of coercion it disliked.” In contrast to Shleifer and Vishny (1994)'s Public Choice 
criticism of market socialism,9 the problem here with democratic socialism is not that the 
politicians will abuse their power or be insufficiently benevolent or lack proper incentives. There 
is no principle-agent problem here (cf. Caldwell 1997:1875ff.). No matter how benevolent the 
political officials are, and no matter their incentives, any thoroughgoing and successfully-
implemented democratic socialism, say Hayek and Jewkes, must be totalitarian. If anything, the 
more sincere and disinterested the politicians are, the more thoroughly they will strive to 
implement the socialist plan by regimenting labor, without any regard for their own self-
interest.10
On the other hand, the Control of Engagements Order of 1947 was short-lived and its 
enforcement did not amount to much (Farrant 2015). Quoting Toye, McPhail and Farrant 
(2012:426) note that “the [Labour] government’s determination not to violate its own democratic 
precepts meant that it could not take the measures necessary to guarantee the execution of its 
own plans.” The Labour government could not tolerate the illiberal consequences of its own 
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professed commitment to planning, and its liberal commitment to freedom and democracy 
superseded its profession of planning. But pace McPhail and Farrant (2012:426), this does not 
refute Hayek, but on the contrary, it confirms him. The claim of The Road to Serfdom was that 
planning and freedom are incompatible (cf. Lawson and Clark 2010). The fact that Labour 
ultimately had to choose between the two proves Hayek right. Hayek had argued only that 
planning and freedom could not be obtained simultaneously, and the fact that Labour chose one 
over the other is consistent with Hayek's (then novel) claim.11
Healthcare provides one interesting example of this labor problem. In another book, A 
Return to Free Market Economics?, Jewkes notes that socialized medicine cannot guarantee true 
equality of access to medical care – including an egalitarian physical distribution of doctors – 
unless the government is “prepared to deprive doctors of freedom to operate in the district of 
their own choice” (1978:84; cf. pp. 67, 70).12 Of course, the government could pay doctors a 
premium to incentivize them to voluntarily relocate to less desirable districts, but this implies 
income inequality. Or the government could distribute health vouchers to its citizens, each worth 
an identical amount of money, so that everyone can afford the same number of dollars of 
healthcare. But then citizens with different medical conditions and living in different districts 
would obtain different levels of healthiness and care for the same number of dollars; once again, 
there would be inequality.13
Astoundingly, none other than the most famous advocate of democratic socialism 
(Makovi 2015a, 2016a) – George Orwell himself – seems to have realized these issues. In 
Orwell's final edition of “London Letters” in the Partisan Review (11:3, summer 1946), Orwell 
argued (to quote Newsinger 1999:139)
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that in conditions of full employment if wages are evened out, workers will drift 
away from the more disagreeable jobs . . . Quite incredibly, he [Orwell] argued 
that socialists had to face up to the fact that “you had to make use of forced labour 
for the dirtier kinds of work.”
Not long before, in July 1945, Orwell had similarly stated in the Partisan Review that Britain 
“will be obliged to both coerce the miners” and that “post-war reconstruction . . . [would require] 
'direction' of labour over a long period” (quoted in Farrant 2015:176n43).14 
Thus, Hayek and Jewkes have shown how abandonment of the price-system and enforced 
income equality tends to necessitate resort to labor-conscription – at least, if economic activity is 
to maintained. Even Orwell agreed with this. It is difficult to determine how democracy could 
successfully prevent socialism from turning tyrannical, if any form of egalitarian socialism 
necessarily requires compulsory labor. If central economic planning cannot work without 
conscription of labor, then democratic socialism amounts to letting the slave elect his slave-
master without the freedom to leave the plantation. If any economic plan is necessarily 
totalitarian, then democracy will do little to help. Democratic socialism must resort to 
conscription of labor not because power has been maliciously abused but because wages have 
been forced towards equality. Even the most kind-hearted and benevolent planner would have 
little choice. 
2. Freedom of Occupation under Market Socialism
Strictly speaking, however, government ownership or regulation of the means of 
production does not require equality of wages. Oskar Lange could state“[f]reedom of choice of 
9
occupation [is] assumed” under socialism (1938:83) and that we can “assume that freedom of 
choice in consumption and freedom of choice of occupation are maintained” by socialism 
(1938:72) precisely because Lange accepted income inequality. Discussing the distribution of 
profits and interest to the citizens in the form of a social dividend, Lange (1938:83f.) states,
Freedom of choice of occupation assumed, the distribution of the social dividend 
may affect the amount of services of labor offered to different industries. If certain 
occupations received a larger social dividend than others, labor would be diverted 
into the occupations receiving a larger dividend. Therefore, the distribution of the 
social dividend must be such as not to interfere with the optimum distribution of 
labor services between the different industries and occupations. . . . Therefore, the 
social dividend must be distributed so as to have no influence whatsoever on the 
choice of occupation. The social dividend paid to an individual must be entirely 
independent of his choice of occupation.
Although Lange is discussing the distribution of firm dividends, not wages, his statement 
implicitly agrees with Hayek and Jewkes that the wage or income in any given industry 
determines how many people will choose to be employed in that industry. Therefore, Lange 
specified that under market socialism, wages will be determined by essentially the same method 
they are in a free-market, with approximately the same kind of inequality (cf. Caldwell 
1997:1862). 
But it is hard to imagine how any socialist would be satisfied with such inequality. As 
Hayek (1978 [1976]:304) says in response to Lange, a regime implementing market socialism
could do nothing to secure that the remuneration the the market gave to each 
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participant would correspond to what the government regarded as socially just. 
Yet to achieve such a so-called 'just' remuneration was, after all, the whole 
intended purpose of the socialist revolution!15
Let us not forget that the incomes of business executives and managers and the allocation of 
their labor are all regulated by the same economic principles as the incomes and allocation of all 
other kinds of labor. Managerial and executive labor must be allocated efficiently as well, and 
there is no reason why the market-clearing rate for their labor ought to be significantly different 
under socialism than under capitalism. But this clearly will not satisfy many socialists, who will 
insist on a more thoroughly implemented scheme of (approximate) equality of income. The 
recent reception of Piketty (2014 [2013])'s Capital in the Twenty-First Century should make it 
clear that Lange's endorsement of radical income inequality will not be shared by many 
socialists.
It is also important to note that Lange's statement that “The social dividend paid to an 
individual must be entirely independent of his choice of occupation” is not entirely accurate. This 
implies that a per-capita egalitarian distribution of the social dividend – an exactly equal number 
of dollars per person – would be sufficient to avoid affecting labor incentives. But this is not true 
because incentives and values are always marginal. A $100 dividend given to someone who earns 
$100,000 is not the same as the same $100 dividend given to someone who earns only $50,000. 
Tthe value of an objectively constant thing will subjectively vary, depending on what it is being 
compared to. Whether a person chooses to take one job at one wage or another job at another 
wage will depend on the size of the social dividend. Suppose a person is earning $50,000 and 
they know that they can earn twice as much money by working twice as hard. They may find this 
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worthwhile. But suppose the social dividend is $20,000 per year, independent of a person's 
occupation. Then the choice is not $50,000 versus $100,000, but instead, it is $70,000 versus 
$120,000. And now the person may not regard it worthwhile to work twice as hard to earn 
$120,000 instead of $70,000. Because value is marginal, an egalitarian distribution of the social 
dividend will affect labor incentives. Lange neglected the income and substitution effects of 
labor versus leisure. The social dividend must be distributed unequally in such a way that 
incentives will be the same as if it were never distributed at all. It is difficult – probably 
impossible – to know how to properly distribute the social dividend unequally in such a way as 
to leave incentives unaffected. The challenge of determining how to properly distribute the social 
dividend creates an entirely new problem which Lange's market socialism never addressed. 
Alternatively, Lange could specify an egalitarian distribution of the social dividend and then 
allow wages to vary until the combination of unequal wages plus egalitarian social dividend 
produced an equilibrium pattern of employment. The final income package combining unequal 
wages with equal social dividend would still have to be sufficiently non-egalitarian to efficiently 
allocate labor. 
Assuming that the planned pattern of productive output is sacrosanct – and this implies a 
similarly planned pattern of employment – the social dividend cannot be distributed in such a 
way as to reduce inequality because this would influence the choice of occupation. Freedom of 
choice of occupation thus requires that the government abstain from interfering with inequality 
of income. Wages and incomes must be permitted to be radically unequal. If a specific pattern of 
production is aimed for, then the government must allow wages to freely vary in order to attract 
precisely the right amount and kinds of labor to each industry. Contrariwise, if the government 
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settles upon a policy of income equality, then it cannot aim for any particular pattern of 
productive output or distribution of labor across industries.
Since Harrington (1978:443f.) and Schweickart (1992:11) – two advocates of democratic 
socialism or economic democracy – both approvingly cite Lange, it might be assumed that their 
schemes both presuppose freedom of choice of occupation – and therefore, inequality as well. 
But in fact, neither Harrington nor Schweickart understands Lange's system. Harrington 
(1978:443f.) approvingly cites Lange (1938) and yet he also declares (1978:445) that “The wage 
structure, then, would be infinitely more progressive than it is within capitalism.” Harrington 
(1978:446) adds that “differentials related to skill and output . . . would be tolerated, precisely as 
an incentive for individuals and enterprises to produce more efficiently,” but he is not aware that 
these differentials may have to be approximately as large as they already are under capitalism. 
He advocates (1978:446) “an egalitarian tax policy [that] would severely limit the differentials 
and' work toward a redistribution of income and wealth,” but he fails to understand that an 
egalitarian tax policy would completely negate the wage differentials he had advocated just a 
moment earlier. It makes no sense to provide wage surpluses as rewards and then to turn right 
around and tax them away again. Then Harrington (1978:446) says “a part of the wage would be 
received collectively, as a social dividend from heightened productivity,” but this would entail 
precisely the same problems as it does for Lange, which we have shown. Like Harrington, 
Schweickart specifies that wage differentials will be restricted in order to limit income inequality 
(1992:20n7) even though this is incompatible with his reliance on Lange (1992:11).16 Harrington 
and Schweickart cannot have their cake and eat it too; they cannot have differential wages and 
egalitarian redistribution and a targeted pattern of consumption, production, and employment. 
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One cannot dictate both prices and economic outcomes without resort to direct physical 
coercion. If the government fixes wages and taxes so as to achieve economic equality, then it 
cannot target a specifically patterned economic outcome. If the government seeks to achieve both 
equality and this predetermined productive output, this is possible only through the use of corvée 
and compulsory direction of employment.
In summary: for a socialist government to be authentically socialist – for it to consistently 
and completely plan the economy and maintain equality of wages – it must assign everyone to 
his occupation without any freedom of employment. Otherwise, the government cannot ensure 
the plan will be implemented. Either a democratic socialist government will insist on this 
assignment procedure and become tyrannical, or else it will abandon the assignment procedure 
and permit freedom of employment, preserving democratic values at the cost of abandoning 
socialism. A compromise is possible, but because socialism and individual autonomy are at 
opposite poles and inversely proportional, the one must be sacrificed to the identical degree to 
which the other is not. It is no great consolation to the socialist to be told that any compromise 
between socialism and freedom is an inversely proportioned one, with exactly as much socialism 
as there is not freedom, and vice versa. Another solution is, of course, to allow income inequality 
so that labor is allocated by wage differentials, but this would defeat the egalitarian aims of 
socialism. Farrant (2015) is correct to point out that the Control of Engagements Order of 1947 
was short-lived and barely enforced, and McPhail and Farrant (2012:426) rightly call attention to 
the fact that the Labour government refused to thoroughly execute its own plans in order to 
maintain its adherence to democracy. But this actually confirms Hayek and Jewkes, who had 
simply claimed that planning and freedom are incompatible (cf. Lawson and Clark 2010). The 
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fact that Labour could not maintain democratic freedom without abandoning planning and 
egalitarianism is exactly what Hayek and Jewkes had claimed all along.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY WELFARE STATE
The question remains, however, whether any of this is relevant to the modern welfare 
state or mixed economy. Caldwell (2007: 30f., 2011) states that Hayek's Road to Serfdom does 
not apply to the welfare state. But Farrant and McPhail (2009, 2010) and McPhail and Farrant 
(2012, 2013) note that Hayek claimed that the his argument in The Road to Serfdom did apply to 
the modern welfare state (cf. Hayek 1978 [1976]:300).17 Farrant and McPhail argue that because 
the modern welfare state is not totalitarian and because The Road to Serfdom's thesis does apply 
to the welfare state (by Hayek's own admission), therefore, it follows that the thesis of The Road 
to Serfdom must be wrong. The syllogism is logically valid.
But while that deduction is valid (i.e. the conclusion follows from the premises), it is not 
sound (i.e. accurate) because there are missing premises. We must examine what Hayek 
specifically said about the welfare state. Hayek's earlier and later works must not be conflated, 
and their respective historical and institutional contexts must be considered (Caldwell 2011, 
Boettke and Snow 2012). While all of Hayek's works share a common analytical framework, this 
framework is applied differently, depending on the institutional context and political 
environment.
The first thing to recall is the central role which Hayek's conception of the rule-of-law 
plays in The Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]:112-123). We should therefore expect Hayek's 
criticism of the welfare state to reflect his theory of the rule-of-law. Indeed, in The Constitution 
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of Liberty (2011 [1960]:148-165) and again in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (1977:62-106), he 
argued that redistribution of wealth to achieve social justice inherently violates the rule-of-law. 
Treating people equally will result in unequal outcomes and achieving equal outcomes requires 
treating people unequally (2011 [1960]:150; 1966:170; 1977:82). Hayek interpreted the demand 
for “social justice” – i.e. fair incomes – as appropriate only for an “organization” with unitary 
ends, deliberately shaped by a single human will, but inappropriate for a “catallaxy” (market 
economy), a legal order based on formal, purpose-independent rules which enable individuals to 
pursue their own ends (1966:170-172; 1977:69, 75, 85, 96f., 102f.). Hayek's distinction between 
“catallaxy” and “organization” is similar to that which Oakeshott drew between a civic 
association and an enterprise association, and Hayek believed that the rule-of-law could survive 
only in a civic association (cf. Capaldi and Lloyd 2011: xxiii). Only if society per se has some 
teleological end is it meaningful to declare that certain end-state outcomes are fair or unfair. By 
contrast, if society is understood to be a spontaneous order where individuals are free to 
separately pursue their own ends, then it is only the rules which can be fair or unfair, not the 
outcomes. There is no set of general, abstract, procedural rules of justice whose execution will 
achieve an end-state satisfying social justice (1977:85f.). Replacing commutative with 
distributive justice means displacing private law by public law (1977:87). Achieving a given end-
state requires a discretionary authority to give specific orders to individual people. Transforming 
society from a civic association, a spontaneous order governed by purpose-independent rules, 
into an organization or enterprise association governed by a single comprehensive, overriding 
will, is totalitarian in the literal sense (1977:104; cf. ibid. 83, 99, 180n2). Thus, Hayek 
understood the end-state conception of social justice to be contrary to the rule-of-law. Similarly, 
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Hayek (1966:175) rejected the progressive income tax as discriminatory and too individually 
specific to satisfy the rule-of-law. Therefore, Hayek would dispute Farrant and McPhail (2009)'s 
assertion that the modern welfare state is not totalitarian. If redistribution of wealth is itself a 
violation of the rule-of-law, then the modern welfare state must take us along the road to 
serfdom, almost by definition. Of course, one may dispute Hayek's assertion that redistribution is 
inconsistent with the rule-of-law. But this means disputing subjective, normative ethics, and so 
Farrant and McPhail (2009)'s argument against Hayek becomes less damaging.
Moreover, although Hayek (1966) does not say so explicitly, one gets the impression that 
his fear was that once one or two measures of “social justice” are enacted, violating the rule-of-
law, there will be no intellectually consistent way to reject any other inroads on the rule-of-law. 
As Farrant and McPhail (2009:8n11) / McPhail and Farrant (2013:976) note, sometimes what 
Hayek said was not that the welfare state itself would lead to totalitarian socialism, but rather, 
that the ideas underlying the welfare state would eventually lead to totalitarianism. It is not that 
the progressive income tax will by itself alone lead us down the road to serfdom. Instead, once 
one violation of the rule-of-law is granted – no matter how innocuous in isolation – there will no 
reason not to grant countless others. Hayek criticized one pinprick because he knew that once the 
principle was granted that a person may prick another with moral impunity, there was the 
possibility of death by a million pinpricks. If the slippery slope has been avoided, it may be 
precisely thanks to Hayek's warning.
But Hayek went further than calling attention to an ideological slippery slope and 
attributing to the welfare state the abandonment of the rule-of-law. In The Constitution of Liberty  
(2011 [1960]) and in Law, Legislation, and Liberty (1977), Hayek added that the redistribution of 
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wealth would create specific consequences in labor markets which would necessitate totalitarian 
inroads, similar to what we have seen in The Road to Serfdom. Hayek predicted that people 
would object to inequalities of income that did not correspond to moral desert or merit (Hayek 
2011 [1960]:156). Pursuing “social justice,” the welfare state must rely on price-controls to fix 
the remuneration of labor, in order to ensure that every form of labor receives its “fair” due 
(Hayek 1978 [1976]:300f.). But, he said, this is inconsistent with freedom of occupation: 
“distributive justice is irreconcilable with freedom in the choice of one's activities” (Hayek 2011 
[1960]:156n12). Once incomes are fixed, not according to the economic value of the labor but 
according to merit and desert, labor will no longer be efficiently allocated and employees will 
have no idea where they ought to go. “If the remuneration did not correspond to the value that 
the product of a man's efforts has for his fellows, he would have no basis for deciding whether 
the pursuit of a given object is worth the effort and risk. He would necessarily have to be told 
what to do” (Hayek 2011 [1960]:159f.).18 And again (1977:82):
a government aiming to secure for its citizens equal material positions  . . . would 
have to undertake to tell people what to do. Once the rewards the individual can 
expect are no longer an appropriate indication of how to direct their efforts to 
where they are most needed, because these rewards correspond not to the value 
which their services have for their fellows, but to the moral merit or desert the 
persons are deemed to have earned, they lose the guiding function they have in 
the market order and would have to be replaced by the commands of the directing 
authority.
Hayek continued (1977:84), “Nor could anyone who is assured remuneration according to some 
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principle which is accepted as constituting 'social justice' be allowed to decide what he is to do” 
because remuneration would be according to moral desert instead of economic value. Therefore, 
Hayek (1977:92) concluded, income inequality 
is a necessary concomitant of any system in which remuneration is based on the 
values the services have to the user and not on an assessment of merit earned. It 
must therefore prevail in any social order in which the individual is free to choose 
whatever occupation he can find and is not assigned to one by authority.
For example, suppose we decide that janitors and electrical engineers are equally 
deserving of the same income. Once this parity is established – as we shall see, it makes little 
difference whether by price-controls or by taxation and subsidy – the law of price-controls will 
operate. The market-clearing wages of electrical engineers are greater than the market-clearing 
wages of janitors, and once their wages are compulsorily equated, there will be a relative surplus 
of janitors and a relative shortage of electrical engineers. Whether this implies manifest shortages 
and surpluses, or whether the suboptimal misallocation is concealed, depends on the specific 
interventions. A minimum wage will create an unemployable surplus. But while a subsidy will 
create an over-supply, the over-supply will not be an unemployable surplus. Furthermore, 
unemployment created by a price floor can be concealed by a government price-support, i.e. a 
promise to provide government jobs to all those who cannot find private employment at the 
stipulated wages. But whether the over- and under-supplies are concealed or manifest, the 
inefficient misallocation is real. Unless chaos and inefficiency are tolerated, the labor of janitors 
and electrical engineers must be compulsorily allocated to ensure that precisely the right number 
are employed. Thus, “every such attempt at deliberate control of some remunerations is bound to 
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create further demand for new controls” (Hayek 2011 [1960]:164). One intervention begets 
another, just as Mises (1996 [1929], 1998) predicted.
In a 1976 lecture, Hayek (1978 [1976]) repeated several of these points. Speaking about 
the welfare state, Hayek (1978 [1976]:300) “greatly doubt[ed] their capacity to combine their 
aim of a through government redistribution of wealth with the preservation, in the long run, of a 
modicum of personal freedom.” Hayek claimed that to achieve its goals, the welfare state must 
“preserve functioning markets [in the] . . . factors of production . . . and also somehow . . . to 
influence at least the prices of labour . . . To satisfy both of these requirements in full is 
impossible.” (1978 [1976]:300). Echoing Mises's theory of intervention (Mises 1996 [1929], 
1998), Hayek (1978 [1976]:300) continued, “Though the process may be gradual, a government 
which begins to control prices to secure popular conceptions of justice is bound to be driven step 
by step towards the control of all prices; and, since this must destroy the functioning of the 
market, to a central direction of the economy.” In this lecture, Hayek also repeated the argument 
that with the abolition of differential wages must come the compulsory direction of labor (Hayek 
1978 [1976]:307):
the individual can be left free to choose the directions of his efforts only if 
rewards fluctuate with the value of the services he can contribute to the society's 
common pool of resources. If his income is politically determined, he loses not 
merely the incentive but also the possibility of deciding what he ought to do in the 
general interest. And if he cannot know himself what he must do to make his 
services valuable to his fellows, he must be commanded to do what is required.
If the salaries of janitors and of electrical engineers are made equal, then no individual has any 
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way of knowing whether he will serve the common good better by being one or the other. He 
loses access to the data which would inform him of society's needs as well as the incentive to act 
on any such information. Therefore, the government must compel him to choose that occupation 
where labor is more relatively scarce.
It is important to notice that taxation of incomes is a form of price-control on labor as 
well. If the natural market rate for a given type of labor is $100,000, then there is not much 
difference between taxing that labor to the amount of $30,000 versus fixing that labor at $70,000 
and leaving it un-taxed. The over- and under-supply may be concealed or manifest, but they exist 
either way. 
The reason why progressive income taxes have not produced obviously totalitarian 
outcomes, however, is because contemporary welfare states have not attempted to ensure that 
any particular kind of labor is done with any particular frequency or with any particular 
productive output. In other words, contemporary governments are content to manipulate the 
returns to different kinds of labor and then allow the market to decide how many people will 
occupy themselves in those various occupations and how much output they will produce. They 
have manipulated prices but tolerated the market consequences of those manipulations. As 
Hayek's mentor and colleague, Mises said (1981 [1922]:446), in a free-market, “taxation . . . 
imposes certain obstacles in individual businesses, but leaves the market to deal with its effect 
upon the prices of commodities and wages, on profits, interest, and rents.”
Hayek's emphasis on the role of prices recalls Röpke's distinction between “compatible” 
and “incompatible” interventions:
we find that a differentiation between two groups of state intervention is of 
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foremost importance, for which we have suggested the terms “compatible” and 
“incompatible” interventions: i.e. those that are in harmony with an economic 
structure based on the market, and those which are not. Interventions which do 
not interfere with the price mechanism and with the automatism of the market 
derived from it are compatible, they let themselves be absorbed as new “data”; 
interventions which paralyse the price mechanism and therefore force us to 
replace it by a planned (collectivist) order, we call incompatible. (Röpke1992 
[1942]:260; cf. 1987 [1951]:7f.)
Similarly, referring to J. S. Mill, Hayek spoke of “Mill's Muddle,” the belief that production and 
distribution could be disconnected from one another (Ebeling 1977:11). In fact, production is 
distribution; the same prices simultaneously incentivize and remunerate production, and to alter 
distribution is therefore to alter production. But contemporary welfare states have not attempted 
to direct distribution in one direction and production in the other. Instead, they have intervened in 
one and let the other adjust itself accordingly. If taxing one form of labor and subsidizing another 
has resulted in a shift in productive output and employment from one industry to another, welfare 
states have not generally attempted to counteract this tendency by compulsory redirection of 
labor. Welfare states have thus eschewed any attempts to plan – which is why there are no 
obviously totalitarian consequences. 
But suppose the governments were to take J. S. Mill seriously, and really attempt to 
disconnect production and distribution in order to achieve distributive or social justice. Suppose 
governments were to tax a given kind of labor and simultaneously insist that the employment and 
output in the taxed industry be precisely the same as it was before the tax was implemented. Or 
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suppose these governments were to tax a given kind of labor and also demand that employment 
and output in the corresponding industry satisfy some arbitrarily-determined figure – say, that 
there must be such-and-such a number of coal miners and such-and-such an output of coal – 
regardless of prices. In other words, suppose that “fair” wage controls were imposed to ensure 
“social justice” at the same time that economic planning were attempted. This could not be 
accomplished without compulsion and forcible assignment of employment against the wills of 
those employed. No government may arbitrarily determine incomes according to egalitarian 
standards of “fairness” – whether by setting a tax or by fixing a wage-rate – and simultaneously 
fix a level of employment and output in the corresponding industry, without resort to corvée. 
By contrast, modern welfare states have chosen to relatively equalize wages but permit 
production and employment to vary themselves, not according to any plan. No welfare state 
today fixes the prices of labor in the way which Hayek feared they would. But this does not 
refute Hayek's argument that if welfare states were to fix wages – whether by redistribution or by 
price-control – and to insist on a specific pattern of output and employment regardless of prices – 
then we would wind up traveling along the road to serfdom. The fact that welfare states today 
have wisely eschewed price-controls does not refute Hayek's prediction that such controls would 
carry totalitarian consequences were they to be implemented. Therefore, Farrant and McPhail are 
incorrect to assert that the thesis of The Road to Serfdom has been falsified by the non-
totalitarian nature of contemporary welfare states. The reason is that welfare states have not 
adopted the policies which Hayek feared they would, but we have no reason to doubt Hayek's 
claim that if welfare states had attempted to implement price-controls on labor without affecting 
productive output, this would have required compulsory regimentation of labor. Moreover, if 
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Hayek's prediction was wrong, it is may be because his warning was heeded (cf. Caldwell 
1997:1868f., Witt 1992, Boettke and Snow 2012).19
III. THE ROAD TO SERFDOM RECONSIDERED
Hayek is sometimes neglected in discussions of Public Choice,20 and he is also criticized 
for neglecting the contributions of Public Choice. Boettke (1995) replies that Hayek's (2007 
[1944]) Road to Serfdom anticipated at least three basic teachings of Public Choice:21 first, the 
logic of collective action which enables special interests to obtain privileges. Second, that 
political behavior is conditioned by the institutional constraints and incentives of the office 
(“why the worst get on top”). Third, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (cf. Boettke and Leeson 
2002, Boettke and Snow 2012, Makovi 2016b). In addition, Boettke (1995) discerns in in Hayek 
a fourth discovery, viz. the impossibility of distinguishing between political and economic 
freedom (cf. Lawson and Clark 2010).
In a series of articles, Farrant and McPhail (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) / McPhail and 
Farrant (2012, 2013) have questioned the validity and soundness of Hayek's arguments. First, 
Farrant and McPhail contend that contrary to Caldwell (2007: 30f), Hayek's arguments were not 
directed solely against full-blown command planning and socialism, but that Hayek also believed 
his arguments applied to the contemporary welfare state or mixed economy as well. Because the 
welfare state has not resulted in Soviet- or Nazi-style totalitarianism, Farrant and McPhail say, 
Hayek's arguments must be mistaken. Farrant and McPhail also reject Caldwell's (2011) claim 
that The Road to Serfdom's criticism of central planning must be distinguished from Hayek's 
milder criticism of the welfare state in The Constitution of Liberty (2011 [1960]) and in Law, 
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Legislation, and Liberty (1977). Caldwell (2011, 1997:1866-1871) argues that The Road to 
Serfdom must be understood in its specific historical and institutional context (cf. Boettke and 
Snow 2012) and that it must not be confused with Hayek's later works, which are more relevant 
to the political situation today. Farrant and McPhail claim that Hayek himself considered all his 
works to relate to a single, ongoing theme. In reply, Caldwell (2011) and Boettke and Snow 
(2012) have argued that Farrant and McPhail misunderstand and underappreciate Hayek's 
arguments.
None of the participants in this debate, however, have mentioned how central the price-
system is to Hayek's argument that political liberty presupposes economic liberty. We have seen 
that among Hayek's claims was that freedom of occupation cannot be maintained without the free 
operation of the price-system. Without prices, labor can be allocated only compulsorily. This 
forces us to reevaluate Farrant and McPhail's claims in two ways: first, Farrant and McPhail 
must reconsider the significance of Hayek's claim that political freedom requires economic 
freedom (cf. Boettke 1995, Lawson and Clark 2010). If Farrant and McPhail wish to question the 
merit of Hayek's contributions, they will have to contend with Hayek's argument that freedom of 
occupation cannot be maintained without prices. Second, in demonstrating how crucial prices are 
to Hayek's claims, this essay suggests that it may be a red-herring to ask – as the previous 
participants to this debate have – whether Hayek criticized socialism or the welfare-state. 
Instead, we should say that Hayek criticized any suspension or interference with prices, 
regardless of whether this was in the context of socialism or the mixed economy.
Farrant and McPhail are completely right to criticize simple-minded commentators who 
use The Road to Serfdom to condemn the Obama administration (2010, 2012:95; McPhail and 
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Farrant 2012:423f., 2013:967). At the same time, Boettke (1995), Caldwell (1997, 2011), and 
Boettke and Snow (2012) are correct that Hayek's works have contributed a number of useful 
and valuable analytical insights which are applicable to a variety of economic systems and 
policies. Authors on both sides of the debate are all correct because they have been asking the 
wrong question: they have assumed that either Hayek criticized only socialism, or else he 
criticized both socialism and the mixed economy in exactly the same way. Instead, we argue that 
Hayek's arguments were institutionally contingent: Hayek criticized a given system or policy 
insofar as it interfered with the price-system. Socialism and the mixed-economy interfere with 
prices in different ways and so they produce different effects, but they fall under the same 
analytical umbrella of interference with prices.22
If the welfare state has not take us down the same road to serfdom as command-and-
control socialism, it may be because because taxation and redistribution of income do not 
interfere with the operation of the price system the way command-and-control does (Ikeda 
2015:409, 414). Farrant and McPhail (2009:10n17, 2010:118n13) briefly remark that Hayek 
approvingly cites Ludwig von Mises’s Kritik des Interventionismus (Mises 1996 [1929]; cf. 
Mises 1998).23 But they do not explore the deeper significance of Hayek's citation of Mises. That 
work by Mises was written specifically regarding price-controls, arguing that interventions 
which controlled prices – setting floors and ceilings – would lead to shortages and surpluses 
which would tend to motivate additional interventions to fix the problems caused by price-
controls. Mises argued that one price-control led to another until every price in the entire 
economy was controlled or supplanted by command-and-control, resulting in de facto socialism 
(cf. Mises 1974 [1950]). But Mises's argument does not apply to taxes and subsidies which 
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preserve the operation of the price-system. Significantly, in an essay predominately discussing 
how price-controls lead to socialism, Mises briefly criticizes progressive taxation, and his 
argument is not – as one might expect – that progressive taxation leads to socialism or 
totalitarianism, but only that progressive taxation reduces savings and investment and leads to 
capital decumulation (Mises 1974 [1950]:32; cf. Mises 1981 [1922]:237). Obviously, Mises 
considered price-controls and progressive taxation to lead to quite different outcomes, and it is 
fair to hypothesize that Hayek likely thought similarly. Hayek's arguments are more easily 
understood if we interpret him to be distinguishing – like  Röpke (1992 [1942]:260, 1987 
[1951]:7f.) – between interventions which are compatible with the price-system and those which 
are not. This interpretation of Hayek is more fruitful than debating whether Hayek meant to 
criticize only command planning (Caldwell) or the mixed economy as well (Farrant and 
McPhail). Similarly, for example, a debate between public schooling and school vouchers will be 
more productive if we compare how compatible each is with the price-system, rather than trying 
to pigeon-hole one into the category of “socialism” and the other into “the mixed economy.” We 
suggest that Hayek would have been more favorable towards vouchers than public schooling 
because the former is more compatible with the price-system than the latter.
Farrant and McPhail cite Samuelson (Farrant and McPhail 2009:5,9,11,12; 2010:107; 
2012:101) and Sachs (Farrant and McPhail 2010:98) who argue that if Hayek were correct, we 
may have expected Scandinavian socialism to have turned totalitarian by now. But if we 
understand Hayek to be criticizing interference with the price-system, we see that this criticism 
misses the point entirely. The Scandinavian system has historically relied more on redistribution 
of income than regulation or nationalization. In fact, Sweden offers a high degree of protection of 
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private property and freedom to internationally trade (Stein 1991, Sanandaji 2011, Tupy 2016, 
Mitchell 2016). To a large degree, Scandinavian “socialism” (sic) has entailed giving some 
individuals a cash subsidy and then allowing them free reign to spend this cash however they 
desire in a free market. In many ways, Sweden is more pro-market than the United States. This is 
not socialism of the sort Hayek criticized. Fittingly, Lawson and Clark (2010:235) note that 
according to their empirical analysis,
the Hayek–Friedman hypothesis is confirmed most strongly when looking at the 
legal structure and property rights and the regulation areas of the EFW [Economic 
Freedom of the World] index. These two areas are more closely identified with 
political and civil liberties than the other areas of the EFW index (fiscal size of 
government, monetary policy, and trade policy).
If anything, Scandinavian “socialism” has vindicated Hayek precisely because its success is built 
upon a maintenance of the price-system. Scandinavia has generally eschewed command-and-
control regulation of the sort which would have interfered with the price-system. This suggests 
that it is not safety nets which make robust markets viable – by protecting the least-well-off from 
the vagaries of markets -- but the opposite: it is robust markets which produce the wealth which 
makes safety nets affordable.24 This explains why Sweden can afford its welfare system while 
Greece and Venezuela cannot. Highly-regulated economies cannot absorb the costs of extensive 
welfare states. Sweden has vindicated Hayek by combining a high level of income taxation and 
redistribution with a low level of regulation and command, thereby maintaining the price-system 
and private property.25
Furthermore, there is the crucial question whether actors are permitted to freely adjust 
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their behavior to the tax regime, or whether the state demands behaviors which run counter to the 
incentives created by the taxes – in other words, whether the state requires its subjects to behave 
as if taxed products and activities are not taxed at all (cf. Mises 1981 [1922]:446). Suppose the 
state were to tax the incomes of those employed in a given industry and yet insist that the level of 
employment in that industry remain the same as it was prior to the imposition of the tax. A 
command to behave as if taxation does not exist interferes with the price-system more than the 
taxation itself.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is well-known that Friedman (1962:16-18) chose to illustrate the principle of the 
inseparability of political and economic freedom using the freedom of speech. He famously 
argued that there can be no freedom of the press where the government owns the printing presses 
(cf. Rothbard 1977:26, Mises 1981 [1922]:538). But Hayek (2007 [1944], 2011 [1960]) and John 
Jewkes (1968 [1948]) chose instead to illustrate the inseparability principle using labor 
economics, demonstrating the necessity of compulsorily labor under socialism. According to 
Hayek and Jewkes, egalitarian socialism necessitates the abolition or severe restriction of 
differential wages, making it impossible to allocate labor according to any economic plan 
without resorting to compulsion and regimentation. Moreover, as we saw, Hayek predicted that 
the welfare state would adopt labor regulations which would interfere with the operation of the 
price system and deny the rule-of-law, necessitating resort to compulsory labor. 
Perhaps Hayek and Jewkes chose this example because the problem is so much more 
stark and forbidding. Most citizens do not publish newspaper editorials very often, so the denial 
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of the freedom of speech may not mean much for them. But there is no citizen who would not be 
terrified by the prospect of slavery, the paradigmatic denial of individual freedom. And yet 
socialism cannot operate without literal slavery – compulsory labor. Fittingly, Hayek's work was 
titled, The Road to Serfdom. If socialism requires regimenting labor, what hope for any other 
kind of freedom can there be? 
While Hayek may not have predicted the future accurately, this does not negate the 
validity of his criticism of particular interventions which the government happily turned out to 
eschew. His argument that political liberty is impossible without economic liberty has not been 
refuted (Lawson and Clark 2010). Hayek's argument is an institutionally contingent one, and 
whether a given intervention will lead us down the road to serfdom depends how compatible a 
given intervention is with the functioning of the price system. A tax which allows production, 
employment, and consumption to adjust themselves to the new pattern of prices will not interfere 
with freedom to the same extent as a regulation which simultaneously fixes a tax upon a resource 
or type of labor and nevertheless insists on given level of productive output. Nor is his analysis 
of given policies is wrong simply because the government adopted different policies in the end. 
The analytical framework is not less valid simply because history took one turn rather than 
another – especially if we consider the possibility that Hayek's predictions might have been 
falsified precisely because others heeded his warning (cf. Caldwell 1997:1868f, Witt 1992, 
Boettke and Snow 2012).
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